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Abstract
Election rules are formal processes that aggregate voters preferences, typically to select a
single candidate, called the winner. Most of the election rules studied in the literature require
the voters to rank the candidates from the most to the least preferred one. This method of elic-
iting preferences is impractical when the number of candidates to be ranked is large. We ask
how well certain election rules (focusing on positional scoring rules and the Minimax rule)
can be approximated from partial preferences collected through one of the following proce-
dures: (i) randomized—we ask each voter to rank a random subset of ` candidates, and (ii)
deterministic—we ask each voter to provide a ranking of her ` most preferred candidates (the
`-truncated ballot). We establish theoretical bounds on the approximation ratios, and we com-
plement our theoretical analysis with computer simulations. We find that mostly (apart from the
cases when the preferences have no or very little structure) it is better to use the randomized
approach. While we obtain fairly good approximation guarantees for the Borda rule already
for ` = 2, for approximating the Minimax rule one needs to ask each voter to compare a larger
set of candidates in order to obtain good guarantees.
1 Introduction
An election rule is a function that takes as input a collection of voters preferences over a given
set of m candidates and returns a single candidate, called the winner. There is a large variety of
election rules known in the literature (we refer the reader to the survey by Zwicker [Zwi15] for an
overview); most of them require the voters to provide strict linear orders over the candidates. Yet,
it is often hard, or even infeasible for a voter to provide such a prefernce ranking, especially when
the set of candidates is large. Indeed, it is often believed that a voter can rank at most five to nine
candidates [Mil56].
In this paper we ask how the quality of decisions made through voting depends on the amount of
information available. Specifically, our goal is to assess the quality of outcomes of elections when
each voter can be asked to rank at most ` < m candidates. We compare two ways of eliciting
preferences. In the first approach—which we call randomized—we ask each voter to rank a random
subset of ` candidates. In the second approach—which we call deterministic—we ask each voter to
provide the ranking of her top ` most preferred candidates (the, so-called, `-truncated ballot). For a
number of rules (we analyze positional scoring rules and the Minimax method), we investigate how
well they can be approximated by algorithms that use one of the two elicitation methods.
Our Contribution
Our contribution is the following:
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1. In Section 3.1 we identify a class Sep` of positional scoring rules that, for a given `, can be
well approximated using the randomized approach. Sep2 consists of a single rule, namely the
Borda count; the number of rules in Sep` grows exponentially with `. We theoretically prove
approximation guarantees for the rules from Sep`—these guarantees are more likely to be
accurate when the number of voters is large—we analytically show how, in the worst case,
the approximation guarantees depend on the number of voters. In Section 3.2 we provide an
analogous analytical analysis for the Minimax rule.
2. In Section 4 we prove upper-bounds on the approximation ratios of an algorithm that uses `-
truncated ballots; we prove these bounds both for positional scoring rules and for the Minimax
rule. In both cases, we show that the algorithm that minimizes the maximal regret of Lu and
Boutilier [LB11] (we recall this algorithm in Section 4.1) matches our upper-bounds (for
Minimax our analysis is tight up to a small constant factor).
3. We ran computer simulations in order to verify how the approximation ratio depends on the
particular distribution of voters preferences (Section 5). Our experiments confirm that in most
cases (with the exception of very unstructured preferences) the randomized approach is supe-
rior. We also show that usually only a couple of hundreds of voters are required to achieve a
reasonably good approximation.
Related Work
Our work contributes to the broad literature on handling incomplete information in voting—for a
survey on this topic, we refer the reader to the book chapter by Boutilier and Rosenschein [BR15].
Specifically, our research is closely related to the idea of minimizing the maximal regret [LB11].
Therein, for a partial preference profile P , the goal is to select a candidate c such that the score
of c in the worst possible completion of P is maximized. In particular, algorithms minimizing the
maximal regret yield the best possible approximation ratio. Our paper complements this literature
by (1) providing an accurate analysis of these approximation ratios for various methods (which
allows to better judge suitability of different methods for handling incomplete information), and (2)
by providing the analysis for two natural methods of preference elicitation (which also allows to
assess which of the two methods is better).
Algorithms for minimizing the maximal regret interpret the missing information in the most
pessimistic way: they assume the worst-possible completion of partial preferences. Other ap-
proaches include assuming the missing pairwise preferences to be distributed uniformly (e.g. Xia
and Conitzer [XC11]) and machine-learning techniques (Doucette [Dou14, Dou15]) to “recon-
struct” missing information (assuming that the missing pairwise comparisons are distributed simi-
larly as in observed partial rankings).
Our work is also closely related to the literature on distortion [PR06, CP11, BCH+15]. There,
an underlying utility model is assumed, and the goal is to estimate how well various voting rules that
have only access to ordinal preferences, approximate optimal winners, i.e., candidates that maximize
the total utility of the voters. The concept of distortion has recently received a lot of attention in the
literature. The definition of distortion has for example been adapted to social welfare functions
(where the goal is to output a ranking of candidates rather than a single winner) [BPQ19] and to
participator budgeting [BNPS17]. Some works also study distortion assuming a certain structure of
the underlying utility model (e.g., that it can be represented as a metric space) [ABE+18, AP17,
FFG16, GKM17, GAX17].
Finally, we mention that our randomized algorithms are similar to the one proposed by
Hansen [Han16]. The main difference is that the rule proposed by Hansen asks each voter to com-
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pare a certain number of pairs of candidates, while in our approach we ask each voter to rank
a certain fixed-size subset of them. Hansen views his algorithm as a fully-fledged standalone rule
(and compares it with other election systems, mostly focusing on assessing the probability of select-
ing the Condorcet winner), while our primary goal is to investigate how well our rules approximate
their original counterparts.
2 Preliminaries
An election is a pair E = (V,C), where V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} and C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} denote
the sets of n voters and m candidates, respectively. Each voter vi is endowed with a preference
ranking over the candidates, which is a total ordering of the candidates and which we denote by i.
For each candidate c ∈ C by posi(c) we denote the position of c in vi’s preference ranking. The
position of the most preferred candidate is one, of the second most preferred candidate is two, etc.
For example, for a voter vi with the preference c2 i c3 i c1, we have posi(c1) = 3, posi(c2) = 1,
and posi(c3) = 2.
For an integer t we use [t] to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , t} and we use the Iverson bracket
notation—for a logical expression P the term [P ] means 1 if P is true and 0 otherwise.
A voting rule is a function that, for a given election E, returns a subset of candidates, which we
call tied winning candidates. Below we describe several (classes of) voting rules that we will focus
on in this paper.
A positional scoring function is a mapping λ : [m] → R that assigns to each position a real
value: intuitively, λ(p) is a score that a voter assigns to a candidate that she ranks as her p-th most
preferred one. For each positional scoring function λ we define the λ-score of a candidate c as
scλ(c) =
∑
vi∈V λ(posi(c)), and the corresponding election rule selects the candidate(s) with the
highest λ-score. Examples of common positional scoring rules include:
Borda rule: Based on a linear decreasing positional scoring function, the Borda rule is formally
defined by β(p) = m− p for p ∈ [m].
Plurality rule: Being equivalent to the 1-approval rule, the positional scoring function for the Plu-
rality rule assigns a score of one to the first position and zero to all others.
Another important class of voting rules origins from the Condorcet criterion. It says that if there
exists a candidate c that is preferred to any other candidate by a majority of voters, then the voting
rule should select c. We focus on one particular rule satisfying the Condorcet criterion (we chose a
rule picking the candidates that maximize a certain scoring function so that we could apply to the
rule the standard definition of approximation):
Minimax rule. For an election E = (V,C) and two candidates c, c′ ∈ C, we define scMM(c, c′) =
|{vi ∈ V | c i c′}| as the number of voters who prefer c to c′ and we set
scMM(c) = min
c′ 6=c
{scMM(c, c′)}.
The rule then selects the candidates with the highest scMM score.
Since all rules described above select the candidates with the maximal scores (with particular
rules differing in how the score should be calculated), a natural definition of approximation applies.
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Definition 1. We say that A is an α-approximation algorithm for a rule R if for each election
instance E it holds that:
scoreR(A(E))
maxw∈R(E) scoreR(w)
≥ α,
where scoreR is a function representing the score R awards each candidate, R(E) is the set of
winners returned byR, and A(E) is the candidate returned A.
Later on, we will consider algorithms that have access only to certain parts of the input instances.
In such cases the above definition still applies. For example, let trunc(E, `) denote the ` truncated
instance obtained from E, i.e., a partial election which for each voter contains her preferences rank-
ing from E, truncated to the top ` positions. Then we say that A is an α-approximation algorithm
forR for `-truncated instances, when for each election instance E it holds that:
scoreR(A(trunc(E)))
maxw∈R(E) scoreR(w)
≥ α.
3 Randomized Approach
In this section we explore a randomized approach, where each voter can be asked to rank a random
subset of candidates.
3.1 Scoring Rules
We start our analysis by looking at the class of positional scoring rules. For the sake of simplicity
we will assume throughout this section that n is divisible by m1. We first present an algorithm that
estimates the score of each candidate and picks the candidate with the highest score. The algorithm
is parameterized with a natural number ` ≤ m and a vector of ` reals α = (α1, . . . , α`)—for a fixed
vector α we will call the algorithm α-PSF-ALG. This algorithm asks each voter to rank a random
set of ` candidates. We say that a candidate c is ranked by a voter v if c belongs to the set of `
candidates that v was asked to rank. If c is the i-th most preferred among the candidates ranked by a
voter, then c receives the score of αi from the voter. Such scores are summed up for each candidate,
normalized by the number of voters who ranked the respective candidate, and the candidate with the
highest total score is declared the winner. Pseudcode of the algorithm is given in Algorithm 1.
Below, we will show that for some positional scoring rules, by choosing the vector α carefully,
we can find good approximations of winning candidates with high probability. First, through The-
orem 1 we establish a relation between positional scoring functions λ and vectors α that should be
used to assess λ; the formula is not intuitive, and we will discuss it later on. In particular, we will
explain which positional scoring functions can be well approximated using this approach, that is,
we will discuss the structure of the class of positional scoring functions which are covered by the
following theorem.
Theorem 1. Fix a non-increasing sequence of ` reals α = (α1, . . . , α`) and consider the positional
scoring function λα defined by
λα(p) =
1(
m−1
`−1
) · ∑`
i=1
αi
(
p− 1
i− 1
)
·
(
m− p
`− i
)
.
1We will always implicitly assume that n is much larger than m, and we will use randomized algorithms only. Thus,
ifm does not divide n, then in our algorithms we can add a preliminary step that randomly selects a set of n′ =
⌊
n
m
⌋ ·m
voters, and ignores the remaining n−n′ ones. We mention that other authors also suggested to give multiple randomized
ballots to each voter.
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Algorithm 1: Algorithm α-PSF-ALG for computing positional scoring functions.
1 foreach candidate c do
2 total score(c)← 0
3 ranked(c)← 0
4 foreach voter v do
5 Sv ← random set of ` candidates
6 ask v to rank Sv
7 foreach c ∈ Sv do
8 if c is ranked i-th among Sv then
9 total score(c)← total score(c) + αi
10 ranked(c)← ranked(c) + 1
11 foreach candidate c do
12 score(c)← n·total score(c)ranked(c)
13 return candidate c with maximal score(c)
For a candidate c ∈ C that is ranked by at least one voter, we denote by Xc the random variable
describing the total normalized score that c was assigned by α-PSF-ALG. Then, the expected
value E(Xc) is equal to the λα-score of c, and the probability that the score computed by α-PSF-
ALG for c differs from its expected value by a multiplicative factor of 1 ±  is upper-bounded
by 2 exp
(
− 2E(Xc)3
)
, i.e.,
p = P
(
|Xc − E(Xc)| ≥ E(Xc)
)
≤ 2 exp
(
−
2`scλα(c)
6mα1
)
.
Proof. Let us fix a candidate c ∈ C who is ranked by at least one voter. The process of computing
the score of c according to Algorithm 1 can be equivalently described as follows. We first decide on
the number x of voters we ask to rank c. Second, we pick uniformly at random a set V ′ of x voters
such that all voters in V ′ are asked to rank c and all voters in V \V ′ are not asked to rank c. Finally,
we ask each voter from V ′ to rank c and a randomly selected set of ` − 1 candidates. Let Nc be
a random variable describing the number of voters who rank c. Further, for each voter v, let Xv,c,i
denote the random variable equal 1 if c is the i-th candidate among those ranked by voter v and zero
otherwise. In particular, Xv,c,i is zero when v is not asked to rank c. Observe that if Nc = x, then
the value of Xc can be expressed as
Xc =
n
x
·
∑
v∈V
∑`
i=1
αiXv,c,i.
Further, let AV ′,c be 1 if each voter from V ′ ranks c and 0 otherwise. Similarly, let Av,c be 1
if v ranks c and 0 otherwise. Let indv(S, c, i) be equal to 1 if c is ranked as the i-th most pre-
ferred candidate among S by v and 0 otherwise. We next compute the conditional expected value
E(Xc|Nc = x). We first give the formal equalities and give reasoning for the more complicated
ones afterwards.
E(Xc|Nc = x) = E
(
n
x
·
∑
v∈V
∑`
i=1
αiXv,c,i|Nc = x
)
=
n
x
·
∑
v∈V
∑`
i=1
αiE(Xv,c,i|Nc = x) (1)
5
=
n
x
·
∑
v∈V
∑`
i=1
αi
∑
V ′⊆V
|V ′|=x
v∈V ′
P(AV ′,c = 1|Nc = x)E(Xv,c,i|AV ′,c = 1)
=
n
x
·
∑`
i=1
αi
∑
v∈V
∑
V ′⊆V
|V ′|=x
1(
n
x
) [v ∈ V ′]E(Xv,c,i|AV ′,c = 1)
=
n
x
·
∑`
i=1
αi
∑
v∈V
∑
V ′⊆V
|V ′|=x
1(
n
x
) [v ∈ V ′]P(Av,c = 1|AV ′,c = 1)E(Xv,c,i|Av,c = 1)
(2)
=
n
x
·
∑`
i=1
αi
∑
v∈V
1(
n
x
) · (n− 1
x− 1
)
E(Xv,c,i|Av,c = 1) (3)
=
∑`
i=1
αi
∑
v∈V
E(Xv,c,i|Av,c = 1) (4)
=
∑`
i=1
αi
∑
v∈V
1(
m−1
`−1
) ∑
S⊆C
|S|=`
[c ∈ S] · indv(S, c, i) (5)
=
1(
m−1
`−1
) ∑
v∈V
∑`
i=1
αi
(
posv(c)− 1
i− 1
)
·
(
m− posv(c)
`− i
)
(6)
=
∑
v∈V
λα(posv(c)) = scλα(c). (7)
We will now explain some of the equalities in the above sequence. (3) is an effect of regrouping
the summands; each summand E(Xv,c,i|Av,c = 1) in the previous line is added for each set V ′ ⊆ V
of size x which includes v—there are
(
n−1
x−1
)
such sets and [v ∈ V ′] · P(Av,c = 1|AV ′,c = 1) is the
same as [v ∈ V ′]. (5) holds for the following reason: A voter who ranked c was asked to rank some
set of ` candidates including c. Each possible set has the same probability of being selected, thus
this probability is 1/(m−1`−1 ). (6) is true as we will show that
∑
S⊆C [c ∈ S][|S| = `]indv(S, c, i) =(posv(c)−1
i−1
) · (m−posv(c)`−i ). Consider a fixed voter v, a fixed candidate c, and a set S ⊆ C such that
(i) c ∈ S, (ii) |S| = `, and (iii) v considers c to be her i-th most preferred candidate from S. Each
such a set must consist of i − 1 candidates that are ranked before c by v and ` − i candidates that
are ranked after c. Thus, there are
(posv(c)−1
i−1
) · (m−posv(c)`−i ) such sets. We refer to Fig. 1 for an
illustration.
Next, we will use the Chernoff’s inequality to assess the probability that the computed score
of a candidate c does not differ from its true score by a factor of . We will first assess the con-
ditional probability P
(
|Xc − E(Xc)| ≥ E(Xc)|Nc = x
)
. Observe that the conditional variables
{Xv,c,i|Nc}v∈V,i∈[`] are not independent. For instance, if Xv,c,i = 1, then Xv,c,j = 0 for each j 6= i.
However, they are all negatively correlated—intuitively meaning that if a variable becomes 1 (resp.,
0), then the other variables are less likely to become 1 (resp., 0). Thus, we can still apply the Cher-
noff’s bound [AD11, Theorem 1.16, Corollary 1.10] which states that for any negatively-correlated
6
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Figure 1: An illustration explaining that there are
(posv(c)−1
i−1
) · (m−posv(c)`−i ) possible sets S that
satisfy c ∈ S, |S| = ` and c is ranked at position i in S by v. Each field indicates a candidate and
the number below a field indicates the position. The yellow field indicates c, a red field indicates
a candidate in S that was ranked after c by v and a green field indicates a candidate in S that
was ranked before c by v. A white field indicates a candidate that was not ranked by v. In this
example m = 11, i = 3, posv(c) = 6, and ` = 4.
random variables X1, . . . , Xn ∈ [0, 1] such that X =
∑n
i=1Xi and any δ ∈ [0, 1] it holds that
P(X ≤ (1− δ)E(X)) ≤ exp(−δ2E(X)/2) and P(X ≥ (1 + δ)E(X)) ≤ exp(−δ2E(X)/3).
(8)
It follows immediately that P(|X − E(X)| ≥ δE(X)) ≤ 2 exp (−δ2E(X)/3).
Now, consider the variables Xv,c,iαiα1 . These variables are from [0, 1] and from Eqs. (1) to (7) we
get that
E
(∑
v∈V
∑`
i=1
Xv,c,iαi
α1
|Nc = x
)
=
x
nα1
scλα(c).
This yields
P
(
|Xc − E(Xc)| ≥ E(Xc)|Nc = x
)
= P
( ∣∣∣∣ xnα1Xc − E
(
x
nα1
Xc
)∣∣∣∣ ≥ E( xnα1Xc
)
|Nc = x
) Eq. (8)
≤ 2 exp
(
−
2xscλα(c)
3nα1
)
.
Finally, using the binomial identity (x+ y)n =
∑n
k=1
(
n
k
)
xkyn−k we get
P
(
|Xc − E(Xc)| ≥ E(Xc)
)
=
n∑
x=0
P(Nc = x) · P
(
|Xc − E(Xc)| ≥ E(Xc)|Nc = x
)
≤
n∑
x=0
(
n
x
)
·
(
m−1
`−1
)x ((m
`
)− (m−1`−1 ))n−x(
m
`
)n · 2 exp(−2xscλα(c)3nα1
)
= 2 exp
(
−
2scλα(c)
3nα1
)
·
n∑
x=0
(
n
x
)
·
(
`
m
)x(
1− `
m
)n−x
· e−x
= 2 exp
(
−
2scλα(c)
3nα1
)
·
(
1− `
m
+
`
em
)n
≤ 2 exp
(
−
2scλα(c)
3nα1
)
·
(
1− `
2m
)n
≤ 2 exp
(
−
2scλα(c)
3nα1
)
· e− `n2m = 2 exp
(
−
2`scλα(c)
6mα1
)
.
This concludes the proof.
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Figure 2: A basis of the space Sep` = {λα : α ∈ R`} for three different values of ` (to compute the
basis we took vectors α ∈ {ηi : i ∈ [`]}, where ηi is a vector with 1 in the i-th position, and 0 in the
remaining `− 1 positions). Each plot illustrates ` PSFs that span the space of all PSFs which can be
correctly assessed by algorithm α-PSF-ALG while asking each voter to rank only ` candidates.
Now, let us discuss the form of positional scoring functions λα(p) used in the statement of
Theorem 1. First, observe that for ` = 2, if we set α2 = 0 and α1 = 1 we have that λα(p) =(
p−1
0
) · (m−p2−1 ) = m− p = β(p). This means that by asking each voter to rank only two candidates,
we can correctly (in expectation) assess the Borda scores of the candidates.
Corollary 2. For a candidate c the expected value of the score computed by Algorithm (1, 0)-SEP-
ALG for c is the Borda score of S.
Unfortunately, not every positional scoring function can be efficiently assessed while asking
each voter to rank only few candidates. For example, we can generalize Corollary 2 and show that
for any vector of two elements α = (α1, α2), the algorithm α-SEP-ALG can only compute scores
that are affine transformations of the Borda scores (thus, for ` = 2 the algorithm can only be used
to approximate the Borda rule).
We will now describe the class of all positional scoring functions which can be computed cor-
rectly in expectation by our algorithm for any fixed `. Since each positional scoring function is
based on somem-dimensional vector β = (β1, β2, . . . , βm) which can be expressed as
∑m
i=1 αi ·βi,
where α1 = (1, 0, . . .), α2 = (0, 1, 0, . . .) and so on, these α-vectors form a basis of the linear space
of positional scoring functions.
Let Sep` = {λα : α ∈ R`} be the set of all positional scoring functions that can be computed
(correctly in expectation) by our algorithm for a fixed `. Since it holds for each two `-element vectors
α, α′ ∈ R` that λα+α′(p) =
∑`
i=1(αi + α
′
i)
(
p−1
i−1
)(
m−p
`−i
)
=
∑`
i=1 αi
(
p−1
i−1
)(
m−p
`−i
)
+
∑`
i=1 α
′
i
(
p−1
i−1
) ·(
m−p
`−i
)
= λα(p) + λα′(p), we have that Sep` is a linear space too.
Thus, Sep` is an `-dimensional linear subspace of the m-dimensional space of all positional
scoring functions, and so we can compactly describe it by providing ` scoring functions forming a
basis of Sep`. Figure 2 visually illustrates the scoring functions forming a basis for ` ∈ {2, 4, 8}. In
other words, for a given value of `, we can use Theorem 1 to correctly compute (in expectation) all
scoring functions which can be obtained as linear combinations of the scoring functions depicted in
Figure 2.
Finally, let us give some intuition regarding the probabilities assessed in Theorem 1. For exam-
ple, for m = 21 candidates and n voters the Borda score of a winning candidate is at least 10n.
Assume that we want to ask each voter to compare only two candidates, and set  = 0.01. When
assessing the score of a winning candidate, to get p < 0.001 we need about 72 thousands voters.
For one million voters, this probability drops below 4/1042.
Finally, note that Theorem 1 applies to any candidate, not only to election winners. This makes
the result slightly more general, since it also applies to e.g., social welfare functions, where the goal
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Algorithm 2: Algorithm for computing winners according to the Minimax rule.
1 foreach candidates c, c′ ∈ C do
2 S[c, c′]← 0
3 foreach voter v do
4 Sv ← random set of ` candidates
5 ask v to rank Sv
6 foreach c ∈ Sv do
7 foreach c′ ∈ Sv \ {c} do
8 if c i c′ then
9 S[c, c′]← S[c, c′] + 1
10 foreach candidate c do
11 S[c]← n ·min
{
S[c,c′]
S[c,c′]+S[c′,c] : c
′ 6= c,S[c, c′] + S[c′, c] > 0
}
12 return candidate c with maximal S[c]
is to output a ranking of the candidates instead of a single winner.
3.2 Minimax Rule
We will now investigate whether the Minimax rule can be well approximated when each voter is
only asked to rank a few candidates. We will use an algorithm similar to Algorithm 1: each voter
v ranks a subset of candidates Sv and whenever two candidates c, c′ ∈ Sv are ranked by a voter v,
we use her preference list to estimate scMM(c, c′). Notably, we scale the values scMM(c, c′) for each
two candidates c, c′ ∈ C by the number of times they were compared and use these normalized
values to compute the Minimax winner. This algorithm is formalized in Algorithm 2.
Theorem 3. For each candidate c ∈ C the probability that the total normalized score computed by
Algorithm 2 for c differs from the true Minimax score of c by a multiplicative factor of at least 1± 
is upper-bounded by:
m exp
(
−
2`2scMM(c, cmin)
6m2
)
Proof. First, let us fix a pair of candidates c, c′ ∈ C and let Xc,c′ be the random variable describing
the value n · S[c,c′]S[c,c′]+S[c′,c] as computed by Algorithm 2. Similarly as in the proof of Theorem 1 we
can express Xc,c′ as a sum of negatively correlated random variables.
Specifically, computing S[c, c′] according to Algorithm 2 can be equivalently described as fol-
lows: First, we decide on how many voters will be asked to compare c and c′. Let Nc,c′ be the
random variable describing this number of voters. Second, assuming Nc,c′ = x, we pick uniformly
at random a set V ′ of x voters, and we ask them to compare c and c′. For each voter v, let Xv,c,c′
denote the random variable equal 1 if voter v said that she prefers c to c′, and 0 otherwise. In par-
ticular, Xv,c,c′ is zero when v is not asked to compare c and c′. Observe that if Nc,c′ = x, then
S[c, c′] + S[c′, c] = x, and so the value of Xc,c′ can be expressed as
Xc,c′ =
n
x
·
∑
v∈V
Xv,c,c′ .
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We next compute the conditional expected value E(Xc|Nc,c′ = x):
E(Xc,c′ |Nc,c′ = x) = E
(
n
x
·
∑
v∈V
Xv,c,c′ |Nc,c′ = x
)
=
n
x
·
∑
v∈V
E(Xv,c,c′ |Nc,c′ = x)
=
n
x
·
∑
v∈V
∑
V ′⊆V : |V ′|=x
[v ∈ V ′] · [c v c′]
=
n
x
·
∑
v∈V
(
n−1
x−1
)(
n
x
) [c v c′]
=
∑
v∈V
[c v c′] = scMM(c, c′).
Next, we will use the Chernoff’s inequality to upper-bound the probability that the value of
random variable Xc,c′ does not differ from its expected value by a factor of . We first look at the
conditional probability P
( ∣∣Xc,c′ − E(Xc,c′)∣∣ ≥ E(Xc,c′)|Nc,c′ = x). As in the proof of The-
orem 1, we note that the conditional variables {Xv,c,c′ |Nc,c′ = x}v∈V are not independent, yet
they are all negatively correlated—the fact that one variable becomes 1 (resp., 0) can only de-
crease the probabilities that some other becomes 1 (resp., 0). Thus, we can still apply the Chernoff’s
bound [AD11, Theorem 1.16, Corollary 1.10], which states that for any negatively-correlated ran-
dom variables X1, . . . , Xn ∈ [0, 1] such that X =
∑n
i=1Xi and any δ ∈ [0, 1] it holds that
P(|X − E(X)| ≥ δE(X)) ≤ 2 exp (−δ2E(X)/3) .
Since, for each v ∈ V , we have Xv,c,c′ ∈ {0, 1}, and E
(∑
v∈V Xv,c,c′ |Nc,c′ = x
)
= xnscMM(c, c
′),
we get that:
P
( ∣∣Xc,c′ − E(Xc,c′)∣∣ ≥ E(Xc,c′)|Nc,c′ = x) ≤ 2 exp(−x2scMM(c, c′)
3n
)
Next, we get that:
P
( ∣∣Xc,c′ − E(Xc,c′)∣∣ ≥ E(Xc,c′))
=
n∑
x=0
P(Nc,c′ = x) · P
( ∣∣Xc,c′ − E(Xc,c′)∣∣ ≥ E(Xc,c′)|Nc,c′ = x)
≤
n∑
x=1
P(Nc,c′ = x) · 2 exp
(
−x
2scMM(c, c
′)
3n
)
.
Notice that P(Nc,c′ = x) can be represented by the following. First we decide for x out of n
voters to rank c and c′. We then ask these x voters to rank l − 2 out of m− 2 remaining candidates
and ask all other n− x voters to not rank c and c′. This can be modeled by (m` )− (m−2`−2 ) as (m` ) is
the total number of possible sets to ask a voter to rank and as discussed before, there are
(
m−2
`−2
)
sets
that contain c and c′. Hence
P(Nc,c′ = x) =
(
n
x
)
·
(
m−2
`−2
)x ((m
`
)− (m−2`−2 ))n−x(
m
`
) and thus
n∑
x=1
P(Nc,c′ = x) · 2 exp
(
−x
2scMM(c, c
′)
3n
)
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=
n∑
x=1
(
n
x
)
·
(
m−2
`−2
)x ((m
`
)− (m−2`−2 ))n−x(
m
`
)n · 2 exp(−x2scMM(c, c′)3n
)
= 2 exp
(
−
2scMM(c, c
′)
3n
)
·
n∑
x=1
(
n
x
)
·
(
`(`− 1)
m(m− 1)
)x
·
(
1− `(`− 1)
m(m− 1)
)n−x
·
(
1
e
)x
.
Again using the binomial identity (x+ y)n =
∑n
k=1
(
n
k
)
xkyn−k, we get
2 exp
(
−
2scMM(c, c
′)
3n
)
·
n∑
x=1
(
n
x
)
·
(
`(`− 1)
m(m− 1)
)x
·
(
1− `(`− 1)
m(m− 1)
)n−x
·
(
1
e
)x
= 2 exp
(
−
2scMM(c, c
′)
3n
)
·
(
1− `(`− 1)
m(m− 1) +
`(`− 1)
em(m− 1)
)n
= 2 exp
(
−
2scMM(c, c
′)
3n
)
·
(
1− `(`− 1)(e− 1)
m(m− 1)e
)n
≤ 2 exp
(
−
2scMM(c, c
′)
3n
)
·
(
1− `
2
2m2
)n
≤ 2 exp
(
−
2scMM(c, c
′)
3n
)
· exp
(
− `
2
2m2
n
)
≤ 2 exp
(
−
2`2scMM(c, c
′)
6m2
)
Finally, let cmin = argminc′ 6=c scMM(c, c′). The probability that for candidate c the score com-
puted by Algorithm 2 differs from its true Minimax score by a multiplicative factor of at least 1± 
is upper-bounded by
P
(
min
c′ 6=c
Xc,c′ < scMM(c, cmin)(1− )
)
+ P
(
min
c′ 6=c
Xc,c′ > scMM(c, cmin)(1 + )
)
.
Clearly, we have:
P
(
min
c′ 6=c
Xc,c′ > scMM(c, cmin)(1 + )
)
≤ P
(
Xc,cmin > scMM(c, cmin)(1 + )
)
≤ exp
(
−
2`2scMM(c, cmin)
6m2
)
.
Further, since by definition for each c′ we have scMM(c, c′) ≥ scMM(c, cmin), it holds that:
P
(
min
c′ 6=c
Xc,c′ < scMM(c, cmin)(1− )
)
≤
∑
c′ 6=c
P
(
Xc,c′ < scMM(c, cmin)(1− )
)
≤
∑
c′ 6=c
P
(
Xc,c′ < scMM(c, c
′)(1− )
)
≤
∑
c′ 6=c
exp
(
−
2`2scMM(c, c
′)
6m2
)
≤
∑
c′ 6=c
exp
(
−
2`2scMM(c, cmin)
6m2
)
≤ (m− 1) exp
(
−
2`2scMM(c, cmin)
6m2
)
.
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Thus we get that
P
(
min
c′ 6=c
Xc,c′ < scMM(c, cmin)(1− )
)
+ P
(
min
c′ 6=c
Xc,c′ > scMM(c, cmin)(1 + )
)
≤ m exp
(
−
2`2scMM(c, cmin)
6m2
)
, completing the proof.
4 Deterministic Approach (`-Truncated Elections)
When not asking each voter about each candidate, one always has to decide whether each voter
is asked about random candidates or about specific ones. On the one hand, asking about specific
positions in preference rankings, allows one to focus on the top ones that seem to contain more
relevant information; especially when the goal is to select the winner, who—intuitively—is more
likely to appear in top positions. On the other hand, asking voters about random candidates might be
more advantageous as the input may contain dependencies between candidates that are not known
a priori.
In this section we investigate the case when each voter is asked about her ` most preferred
candidates. We will then describe an algorithm that is guaranteed to approximate the true score at
least as good as any other algorithm and analyze its performance for Borda and for Minimax. We
will then show a general lower bound on the approximation ratio, that is, we show that no algorithm
can approximate the true score in the worst case arbitrarily good and see that it matches the bound
for Borda and almost matches the bound we computed for Minimax.
4.1 The Best Approximation Algorithm for `-Truncated Elections
Let us start by describing the algorithm that for each `-truncated instance gives the best possible
approximation guarantee, that is, the best approximation of the true winner in the worst-case full
preference profile that induces the given `-truncated instance. We mention that the idea of this al-
gorithm is very similar to the one behind the algorithms for minimizing the maximal regret [LB11],
yet the analysis of the approximation ratio of the algorithm is new to this paper.
Consider an election E and let E` be the `-truncated instance obtained from E. Observe that
when given E` and choosing a winner, the worst case occurs if the picked winner is ranked at the
very last position by all voters that did not rank this candidate in E among the first ` positions, and
the true winner (that our algorithm did not pick) is ranked at position ` + 1 by each voter who did
not rank this candidate.
For each candidate c we compute two scores: The worst possible score that c is guaranteed to
get (denoted by worst(c))—this score is obtained when c is ranked last whenever it is not among the
top-` positions—and the best possible score that c can get (denoted by best(c))—the score obtained
by ranking c at position ` + 1 whenever it is not ranked among the first ` positions. Let a, b1,
and b2 be the candidates with the highest worst, the highest best, and the second highest best score,
respectively. If any candidate c 6= b1 is declared winner, then we can guarantee an approximation
ratio of worst(c)/best(b1), which is clearly maximized by c = a.
If candidate b1 is declared winner, then we can guarantee an approximation ratio
of worst(b1)/best(b2). Thus, an optimal approximation ratio is achieved by an algorithm that com-
putes all the possible scores and then checks whether a or b1 guarantees a better result. If
worst(a)/best(b1) ≥ worst(b1)/best(b2) it declares a the winner and otherwise it picks b1.
We first show that these two different cases (sometimes choosing a and other times choosing b1
guaranteeing a better approximation ratio) can both occur. Afterwards we analyze the guarantees
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given by each of the two cases and conclude with a family of instances that prove that the obtained
results are tight.
Example 1. Consider the following two instances, each with 5 voters {v1, v2, v3, v4, v5}, 6 candi-
dates {a, b, c, d, e, f}, and ` = 3:
I1 : I2 :
v1 : b > e > a v1 : b > c > a
v2 : b > e > a v2 : b > d > a
v3 : b > d > a v3 : c > e > a
v4 : c > e > a v4 : e > a > b
v5 : d > a > c v5 : d > e > a.
Assume our goal is to find the candidate that would best approximate the Borda winner. The scores
are presented in the two tables below:
I1 worst best
a 16 16
b 15 19
c 8 14
d 9 15
e 12 16
f 0 10
I2 worst best
a 16 16
b 13 17
c 9 15
d 9 15
e 13 17
f 0 10
.
In both instances a is the candidate with the highest worst score and b is (among) the candidates
with highest best score. In instance I1, it is best to declare b winner as it guarantees an approxima-
tion ratio of 15/16 > 16/19. In instance I2 on the other hand, it is best to declare a winner since it
guarantees an approximation ratio of 16/17 > 13/16. Notice that the second term in each inequality
is the approximation ratio guaranteed by choosing the respective other candidate.
Interestingly, while our algorithm provides the best possible approximation, it can select a candi-
date that is not a possible winner, i.e., that is not a winner in any profile consistent with the truncated
ballot at hand.
Example 2. Consider the following instance with 5 candidates a, b, c, d, e, four vot-
ers v1, v2, . . . , v4, and λ = (3, 1, 1, 1, 0).
v1 : b  a
v2 : c  a
v3 : d  a
v4 : e  a
It holds that worst(a) = 4, worst(b) = worst(c) = worst(d) = worst(e) = 3, best(a) = 4
and best(b) = best(c) = best(d) = best(e) = 6 and therefore declaring a winning achieves
the best approximation ratio. However, in any election that is consistent with the given truncated
election, at least two candidates in {b, c, d, e} get at least 5 points while a always gets 4 points.
Thus, a is not a possible winner.
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4.2 Positional Scoring Rules: Approximation Guarantees for `-Truncated Elections
In this section we continue our analysis of the algorithm from Section 4.1, focusing on how well it
approximates positional scoring rules having only access to `-truncated elections. We will now prove
guarantees that each of the two rules (choosing the candidate with highest worst respectively best
score) provide.
Theorem 4. Let R be a positional scoring rule defined by the scoring function λ(i) = αi. The
algorithm from Section 4.1 for `-truncated elections gives an approximation guarantee of∑`
i=1 αi
mα`+1 +
α1−α`+1
α1
∑`
i=1 αi
.
Proof. Let us first assume that the algorithm picks the candidate a with the highest worst score
as a winner. The average worst score each candidate gets is avgw = n/m ·
∑`
i=1 αi. Thus,
worst(a) ≥ n/m ·∑`i=1 αi. Let b be the candidate, different from a that has maximal best score.
Clearly, worst(b) ≤ worst(a). Further, if we fix worst(b), then best(b) is maximized when can-
didate b is ranked among the top ` positions (the positions that are counted for worst(b)) as few
times as possible. This way the number of voters who do not rank b is maximized—and these are
the voters who can contribute additional score (apart from worst(b)) to best(b). That is, if worst(b)
is fixed, then best(b) is higher when b is ranked high by fewer voters rather than when it is ranked
lower but by more voters. Consequently, we can lower bound best(b) by:
worst(b) +
(
n− worst(b)
α1
)
α`+1
Thus, the approximation ratio in this case is at least
approx1 ≥
worst(a)
best(b)
≥ worst(a)
worst(b) + (n− worst(b)α1 )α`+1
≥ worst(b)
worst(b) + (n− worst(b)α1 )α`+1
≥ avgw
avgw+(n− avgwα1 )α`+1
≥
∑`
i=1 αi
mα`+1 +
α1−α`+1
α1
∑`
i=1 αi
.
We next turn to the case when the algorithm picks the candidate b with maximum best score.
The average best score of a candidate is given by
avgb =
n
m
· ((m− `)α`+1 +
∑`
i=1
αi).
Clearly, best(b) ≥ avgb. With a fixed best(b) the worst score of b is minimized when b is ranked
by as few voters as possible (the reasoning is similar as in the previous case). If b is ranked first
by x voters, then its best score would be α1x+ (n− x)α`+1. By solving:
α1x+ (n− x)α`+1 = best(b),
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we get that x = best(b)−nα`+1α1−α`+1 . Thus, b gets the worst score of at least α1
best(b)−nα`+1
α1−α`+1 . Conse-
quently, we can lower-bound the approximation ratio by:
approx2 ≥
worst(b)
best(b)
≥
α1
best(b)−nα`+1
(α1−α`+1)
best(b)
≥
α1
avgb−nα`+1
(α1−α`+1)
avgb
=
∑`
i=1 αi − `α`+1
((m− `)α`+1 +
∑`
i=1 αi) · α1−α`+1α1
.
It is easy to verify that for all a, b, c, d with 0 ≤ a ≤ c ≤ d, b ≥ 0, and (d−c)ac ≥ b it holds
that cd ≥ c−ad−a−b . Substituting into this a = `α`+1, b = (m − `)
α2`+1
α1
, c =
∑`
i=1 αi and d =
mα`+1 +
α1−α`+1
α1
∑`
i=1 αi, we get that∑`
i=1 αi
mα`+1 +
α1−α`+1
α1
∑`
i=1 αi
>
∑`
i=1 αi − `α`+1
((m− `)α`+1 +
∑`
i=1 αi) · α1−α`+1α1
.
We will only show that c ≤ d and (d−c)ac ≥ b as everything else is trivial. Observe that
c ≤ c+ α`+1(m− `) ≤ c+mα`+1 − α`+1
∑`
i=1
αi
α1
= d and
(d− c)a
c
=
m−∑`i=1 αiα1∑`
i=1 αi
`α2`+1 ≥
m− `
`α1
`α2`+1 = b.
Since the algorithm always picks the value that results in a higher ratio, we get the thesis.
Theorem 4 gives a very general result that applies to any positional scoring rule. For instance,
for k-approval we get the approximation ratio of /`m.
Corollary 5. The algorithm from Section 4.1 for k-approval with `-truncated elections, k > `, gives
the approximation guarantee of /`m.
Proof. We instantiate the expression from Theorem 4 for k-approval:∑`
i=1 αi
mα`+1 +
α1−α`+1
α1
∑`
i=1 αi
=
`
m+ 0
.
For the Borda rule, we get the approximation of `
m+ `
m−1 ·`
which on the plot looks similarly to `m
(see the left-hand side plot in Figure 3).
Corollary 6. The algorithm from Section 4.1 for Borda with `-truncated elections, gives the ap-
proximation guarantee of `
m+ `
m−1 ·`
.
Proof. The approximation ratio follows from Theorem 4:∑`
i=1 αi
mα`+1 +
α1−α`+1
α1
∑`
i=1 αi
=
(2m−`−1)`
2
m(m− `− 2) + `m−1 · (2m−`−1)`2
=
`
2
m (m−`−2)(2m−`−1) +
`
m−1 · `2
≥
`
2
m
2 +
`
m−1 · `2
=
`
m+ `m−1 · `
.
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Figure 3: The approximation ratios for the deterministic algorithms from Section 4.1 for the Borda
rule (the left plot) and for the Minimax rule (the right plot). The plot was generated for m = 30.
Note that the plotted line for the Minimax rule is almost indistinguishable from the plotted line
for 1/(m− `/2)
We conclude by providing intuitive explanation of instances that match the bound from Theo-
rem 4. In these instances all candidates get roughly the same worst score and there are two candi-
dates a, b that also get average worst score but only appear as few times as possible in the first `
positions (in the first or second positions only). If candidate a is declared the winner by any rule then
she gets 0 points from all voters, that did not rank her in the first two positions and b gets m− `− 1
points from these voters. Otherwise the winning candidate gets 0 points from all voters that did not
rank her in the first ` positions and a getsm−`−1 points whenever she is not ranked first or second.
Notice that no rule can distinguish between the different instances we just constructed and therefore
building the instance after the rule picked a winner is permitted. In either case, the candidate that is
declared winner by any rule gets points equal to the average worst score and the “true winner” a or b
gets avgworst+(n− avgworstm−1 )(m− `−1) points. Observe that this gives exactly the same conditions
as for the computation of approx1 in the proof of Theorem 4 and hence we have a matching upper
bound.
4.3 Minimax Rule
Let us now move to the analysis of the Minimax rule. We start by showing that no deterministic
algorithm for Minimax can guarantee a better approximation ratio than 1m−` .
Theorem 7. There exists no rule for `-truncated elections F that is a 1m−`−ε -approximation of the
Minimax rule for any ε > 0.
Proof. Consider the following `-truncated instance of election: Let C = {c0, c1, . . . , cm−1} be the
set of candidates and let V = {v0, v1, . . . vm−1} be the set of voters. Let the truncated preference
list of voter vi be
ci  ci+1modm  ci+2modm  · · ·  ci+`−1modm.
Due to symmetry, any candidate can be declared winner by each algorithm. For the sake of sim-
plicity, let us assume that candidate c2 is declared winner. We can then complement this instance
by inserting all candidates that were not ranked by some voter vi in the order suggested by the
subscript, that is,
c1  c2  · · ·  cm.
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On the one hand, only voter v2 prefers c2 over c1 and all other m − 1 voters prefer c1 over c2.
Thus, the Minimax score of c2 is 1. On the other hand, the Minimax score of c1 is m − `. Indeed,
the strongest contender to c1 is cm and ` voters prefer cm over c1 (for ` < m) while m − ` voters
prefer c1 over cm. Thus, no (deterministic) algorithm can achieve a better approximation ration
than scMM(c2)/scMM(c1) = 1/m−`.
Note that in the construction in Theorem 7 one can increase the number of voters to be much
larger than the number of candidates by simply copying all voters a sufficient number of times.
Theorem 7 already shows that with `-trucnated ballots Minimax cannot be well approximated.
In particular, the bound for the Minimax rule is much worse than for scoring-based rules. We do not
know whether the bound from Theorem 7 is tight. Yet, we can show that a simplified variant of the
algorithm from Section 4.1 that computes the maximum worst score of each candidate and declares
the one with the highest score winner, achieves an approximation ratio of 1
(m−`)·
(
1+ `
2
m2−`2−m+`
) .
This approximation ratio is lower-bounded by 1m− /`2 , which means that for reasonably small ` it
(almost) matches the upper bound from Theorem 7 (see the right-hand side plot in Figure 3 for the
comparison of these two bounds).
Theorem 8. The algorithm from Section 4.1 approximates the Minimax rule in `-truncated elections
within a factor of
1
(m− `) ·
(
1 + `
2
m2−`2−m+`
) ≥ 1
m− /`2 .
Proof. We will prove our claim by showing that if all candidates have a worst score of at most x,
then all candidates have a maximum best score of at most x · (m− `) ·
(
1 + `
2
m2−`2−m+`
)
.
Assume towards a contradiction that all candidates have a worst score of at most x and there
exists a candidate f with best(f) > x · (m− `) ·
(
1 + `
2
m2−`2−m+`
)
. We say that c tv d for voter v
and candidates c and d if and only if c is preferred over d by voter v in the `-truncated instance, that
is, either c and d are both among the ` most preferred candidates of v and c is preferred over d or
only c is among the first ` candidates. Since
best(f) = min
c′∈C\{f}
{n− |{v ∈ V | c′ tv f}|}
and best(f) > x · (m− `) ·
(
1 + `
2
m2−`2−m+`
)
, it follows that for all c ∈ C \ {f} we have
n− |{v ∈ V | c tv f}| > x · (m− `) ·
(
1 +
`2
m2 − `2 −m+ `
)
.
Hence for all c 6= f it holds that
|{v ∈ V | c tv f}| < n− x · (m− `) ·
(
1 +
`2
m2 − `2 −m+ `
)
. (9)
We now analyze worst(f). Let occ(d) be the number of times a candidate d occurs in the truncated
instance, that is, the number of voters that rank candidate d among the first ` positions. First, observe
that for each candidate c it holds that
worst(c) ≥ min
c′∈C\{c}
{occ(c)− |{v ∈ V | c′ tv c}|}
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as c is preferred over any c′ at least that often. Hence,
worst(f) ≥ min
c∈C\{f}
{occ(f)− |{v ∈ V | c tv f}|}
Eq. (9)
> occ(f)− (n− x · (m− `) ·
(
1 +
`2
m2 − `2 −m+ `
)
.
Since, by assumption, worst(f) ≤ x, it holds that
x > occ(f)− n+ x · (m− `) ·
(
1 +
`2
m2 − `2 −m+ `
)
,
or, equivalently,
occ(f) < n− x · (m− `) ·
(
1 +
`2
m2 − `2 −m+ `
)
+ x. (10)
Second, notice that if f is ranked among the top ` candidates by at most occ(f) voters, then there
are n − occ(f) voters that do not rank f among the first ` positions and by pigeonhole principle
there is a candidate c ∈ C \ {f} with |{v | c tv f}| ≥ (n − occ(f)) /`m−1. As discussed above,
from Equation (9) it follows that
(n− occ(f)) /`m−1 < n− x · (m− `) ·
(
1 +
`2
m2 − `2 −m+ `
)
,
which is equivalent to
occ(f) > x ·
(m− 1) · (m− `) ·
(
1 + `
2
m2−`2−m+`
)
`
− n(m− 1)
`
+ n.
Plugging in Equation (10) into this inequality, we get that
x ·
(m− 1)(m− `)
(
1 + `
2
m2−`2−m+`
)
`
− n(m− 1)
`
+ n
< n− x · (m− `) ·
(
1 +
`2
m2 − `2 −m+ `
)
+ x
⇐⇒ x ·
(m+ `− 1)(m− `)
(
1 + `
2
m2−`2−m+`
)
− `
`
 < n · m− 1
`
⇐⇒ x < n · (m− 1)
(m+ `− 1)(m− `)
(
1 + `
2
m2−`2−m+`
)
− `
=
n(m− 1)
(m+ `− 1)(m− `) + `2 − `
=
n(m− 1)
m2 −m =
n
m
.
Notice that on the other hand x ≥ n/m as by pigeonhole principle there is a candidate that is
ranked first at least n/m times and hence has a worst score of at least n/m. Thus, we have reached a
contradiction, completing the first part of the proof. We finish the proof by proving
(m− `) ·
(
1 +
`2
m2 − `2 −m+ `
)
≤ m− /`2.
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Observe that
(m− `) ·
(
1 +
`2
m2 − `2 −m+ `
)
= m− `+ `
2(m− `)
(m− `)(m+ `− 1)
= m− `+ `
2
m+ `− 1
m>`≤ m− `+ `
2
2`
= m− /`2.
5 Experimental Evaluation
In Sections 3 and 4 we have assessed the worst-case guarantees of our approximation algorithms. In
this section we investigate how these guarantees depend on particular distributions of the the voters’
preferences. We tested the following distributions over preference rankings:
Impartial Culture (IC). Under the Impartial Culture model each ranking over the candidates is
equally probable.
One-dimensional Euclidean Model (1D). First, we associate each voter and each candidate with
a point from the interval [0, 1]—these points are sampled independently and uniformly at
random. Then, each voter ranks the candidates according to her distance, preferring the ones
which are closer to those which are farther.
Mixture of Mallows’ Models (MMM). In the Mallows’ model [Mal57] we are given a reference
ranking pi and a real value φ ∈ [0, 1]; the probability of sampling a ranking τ is proportional
to φdK(pi,τ), where dK(pi, τ) is the number of swaps of adjacent candidates that are required
to turn φ into τ . We used a mixture of three Mallows’ models: for each of the three models we
drawn the reference ranking pi and the real value φ uniformly at random. Next, we sampled the
parameters λ1, λ2, λ3 that sum up to one; to generate a ranking we first pick one of the three
models, we pick the i-th model with probability λi, and we generate the ranking according to
the Mallows’ model we picked.
Single Peaked Impartial Culture (SPIC). In order to generate a profile we first randomly select
a reference ranking. Then, we generate rankings that are single-peaked with respect to the
reference ranking. Each such single peaked ranking is equally probable. For a definition and
discussion on single-peaked preferences we refer the reader to the book chapter by Elkind et
al. [ELP17].
For each distributions D over preferences and for each approximation algorithmA we ran com-
puter simulations as follows: We set the number of candidates tom = 50 and tested for ` ∈ {2, 5, 8}.
We ran simulations for the number of voters n ranging from 10 to 1000 in steps of 25. For each
combination of values of (`, n) we ran 500 independent experiments, each time computing the ra-
tio r(A,D) between the score of the candidate returned by algorithm A to the score of the optimal
candidate. The averages of these ratios (averaged over the aforementioned 500 simulations) and the
corresponding standard deviations for the Borda and the Minimax rules are depicted in Figure 4 and
Figure 5, respectively.
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Figure 4: Approximation ratio for the two algorithms for the Borda rule (the randomized algorithm
asks to compare ` random candidates, and the deterministic asks for the `-truncated ballot) assessed
through computer simulations.
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5.1 Approximation Algorithms for the Borda Rule
We empirically tested how well the two algorithms that we analyzed theoretically in the previous
sections approximate the Borda rule. Specifically, we implemented Algorithm 1—which we will
refer to as RANDOMIZED, and the algorithm described in Section 4.1. We also checked two other
deterministic heuristics, that appear simple and intuitive:
1. The variant of the deterministic algorithm from Section 4.1 that always picks the candidate
with the highest worst score.
2. An algorithm we call DETER-AVG that, for each voter vi and candidate cj assigns to cj the
score
(a) β(posi(cj)) if posi(cj) ≤ `,
(b) the average score of the unranked positions
∑
p=`+1m β(p)/(m− `), otherwise.
Then, the algorithm picks the candidate with the highest total score.
The three deterministic algorithms were almost indistinguishable in our simulations—DETER-AVG
was slightly better than the other two. Thus, for readability we present the results only for DETER-
AVG and RANDOMIZED and omit the description of the results for the other two deterministic algo-
rithms. We found the following:
1. For preferences with no or with little structure, such as those generated by IC and SPIC, the
deterministic algorithm gives better results. For preferences with more structure, e.g., those
obtained from 1D and MMM models, the randomized algorithm significantly outperforms the
deterministic ones.
2. For each preference distribution that we tested the randomized algorithm gives high quality
approximations unless the number of voters is very small. Our results suggest to ask each
voter to rank a random subsets of alternatives when the goal is to approximate the Borda
rule with limited information from each voter and the number of voters exceeds a couple of
hundreds.
5.2 Approximation Algorithms for the Minimax Rule
Similarly to Section 5.1, we empirically tested how well the randomized algorithm (Algorithm 2)
and the deterministic algorithm from Section 4.1 approximate the Minimax rule. We refer to the two
algorithms as RANDOMIZED and DETERMINISTIC, respectively. We also tested two other natural
heuristics. For each two candidates c and c′, let n(c, c′) denote the number of voters who (i) rank
c and c′ among their ` most preferred candidates and prefer c over c′ or (ii) who rank c but not c′
among their top ` positions. Then:
1. In our first heuristic algorithm, for each pair of candidates, c and c′, we use a method similar
to Minimax, but we replace scMM(c, c′) by n(c, c′). Then, similarly as in the case of the
original Minimax rule we compute for each candidate c the score minc′ 6=c n(c, c′) and pick
the candidate w with the maximal score.
2. In the second heuristic, we set replace scMM(c, c′) by
n · n(c, c
′)
n(c, c′) + n(c′, c)
.
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In our simulation DETERMINISTIC outperformed the two heuristic algorithms we mentioned
above, hence we present our results only for DETERMINISTIC and RANDOMIZED. We observed the
following:
1. The randomized algorithm for the Minimax rule needs to ask each voter to be compare more
candidates than in case of Borda to achieve a good approximation. For m = 50 candidates,
asking each voter to compare ` = 8 of them already gave good results for sufficiently many
voters.
2. The deterministic algorithm usually performs better than the randomized one, yet there are
distributions (e.g., the one-dimensional Euclidean model) where the quality of winners re-
turned by the deterministic algorithm is much worse than those returned by the randomized
algorithm. On the other hand, for each distribution that we tested, the randomized algorithm
consistently was giving good results when the number of voters and the number of candidates
to ask each voter to rank were sufficiently large.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we theoretically and experimentally analyzed how well certain election rules can be
approximated when we are given only parts of voters’ preferences. We compared two methods of
eliciting voters’ preferences, (i) the randomized method, where each voter is asked to compare a
randomly selected subset of ` alternatives, and (2) the deterministic method, where we ask each
voter to provide a ranking of her ` most preferred candidates. We investigated how well one can
approximate positional scoring rules and the Minimax method through one of these two elicita-
tion methods, providing both upper-bounds on the approximation ratio (impossibility results), and
providing algorithms matching these bounds.
We conclude that the randomized approach is usually superior; the exceptions include prefer-
ence distributions with little or no structure, which rarely appear in practice. For the Borda rule,
with hundreds of voters it is usually sufficient to ask each voter to compare two random candidates
to achieve a high approximation guarantee. Approximating the Minimax rule is harder: one typi-
cally needs more voters and to ask them to compare more candidates—e.g., for m = 50 candidates,
we obtained high approximation guarantees for the Minimax rule only when we set the number of
voters to around thousand and ` = 8.
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